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A MEASURE OF THE FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND
EFFICIENCY OF eBay IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN OF ONLINE FIRMS

Eugene M. Bland; Texas A&M-Corpus Christi
Robert T. Barrett; Francis Marion University

ABSTRACT
This research investigates the auction properties that influence eBay’s effectiveness (ability
to attract bidders) and efficiency (ability to maximize price and profit) as the distribution link of
the supply chain. The research extends the literature pioneered by Lucking-Reiley (2000) on
eBay auctions. We found that the effectiveness of using eBay is influenced by the item description
in the auction heading, the initial price, the timing of the auction and the operating condition of
the item, in our case an inexpensive, functional HP 12-C financial calculator. The efficiency of
eBay, on the other hand, is influenced by the ability to attract bidders, the pricing factors set up
by the seller, the product’s description, its operating condition, the timing of the auction, and the
method of payment options available to the buyer.
INTRODUCTION
More and more businesses are shifting all or major portions of their distribution operations to
the Internet. Newsweek reports that as many as 200,000 businesses currently exist entirely on
eBay (Adler, 2002). A search of the eBay Stores’ directory finds, in addition to a plethora of
small firms, that major retailers such as Dell Financial Services, Ritz Camera, KitchenAid, Sears,
Sharper Image, and IBM now have online storefronts hosted by eBay. These storefronts are the
only presence for some firms. For conventional retailers, eBay provides a venue for selling
surplus, refurbished, or even regular inventory at auction or even fixed prices. This commercial
presence has grown rapidly. Lucking-Reiley (2000) found that "the largest category by far was
that of collectibles: more than 60% of all sites in the survey included auctions for collectibles"
(p. 231). However, Adler (2002) finds that auctions for collectibles "now are just one third
(although of a much larger whole).”
This paper analyzes the role of eBay as the distributor/retailer in the supply chain to estimate
its effectiveness (ability to attract bidder customers) and efficiency (the ability to maximize
profit or minimize cost) in this role. Specifically, regression analysis performed on a data set of
completed auctions for Hewlett Packard (HP)12-C calculators was studied to determine the
variables that attract bidders and affect price in on-line auctions. Unlike the collectible United
States Indian Head pennies in Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves' (2000) data set, or
functional, but expensive items such as the Palm Pilots used in Standifird's (2001) paper, the
calculator in our study was a rather inexpensive, functional product, easily available at several
national retailers and more representative of the types of products that consumers use, rather than
collect.
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Although the focus of this paper is on the distribution segment of the supply chain, online
market makers and arbitrageurs may benefit from the procurement functions as well. These ebusinesses may benefit from creating a market in specific items, such as buying seasonal items at
the end of the season, holding them until the beginning of the next season, and then re-listing
them at a higher price. Likewise, arbitrageurs and other market makers may take advantage of
inefficient listings by procuring the items from the original seller and immediately re-listing
them more efficiently and effectively than the initial seller. For example, the HP-12C was
sometimes listed under the heading of Calculators: Scientific, rather than Calculators: Business.
The arbitrageur could purchase the mis-categorized calculator and re-list it under the more
appropriate category to attract more bidders and potentially higher bids.
The remainder of the paper is organized into the following sections: We review some of the
supply chain literature, identify eBay's place in the supply chain, describe the functions/options
provided by eBay that add value to the transactions for both sellers and buyers, and explain the
methodology used in our research. We then present our hypotheses and results of the study and
conclude with a discussion of the important findings and their implications to supply chain
management.
SUPPLY CHAIN DEFINED AND EBAY’S PLACE IN THE CHAIN
According to Chopra and Meindl (2001) supply chain consists of all stages, direct or indirect,
involved in fulfilling customer requests. Keskinocak and Tayur (2001) establish that the primary
goal of supply chain management is to deliver the correct product to the correct place at the
correct time while maintaining cost efficiencies. Lummus and Vokurka (1999) developed a
summary definition of the supply chain based on the works of numerous authors. They state that
supply chains consist of "all the activities involved in delivering a product from raw material
through to the customer including…distribution across channels, delivery to the customer, and
the information systems necessary to monitor all of these activities" (p. 11). The functions
provided by eBay fit the latter part of this definition very well. Furthermore, they add, "an
integral part of the supply chain is the flow of information between and among all members of
the distribution network" (Vokurka and Lummus, 1998). Indeed, information flow is the primary
function of eBay.
The on-line auction is a unique type of business in that each transaction is a one-time
process. The seller segment of the supply chain is connected to the bidder/buyer using the on-line
auction as a facilitator for this customer-to-customer (C2C) business. eBay as an on-line broker
brings the seller to a host of potential buyers. Keskinocak and Tayur describe eBay’s process as a
proxy bidding agent, increasing the bidder’s bid until the bidder wins the auction or the bidder’s
set maximum bid price is reached (2001). eBay serves as the middleman between sellers and
bidders, facilitates the auction process, and helps to expedite the sale. Lummus, Vokurka, and
Alber indicate that it is critical to manage the link between each node to synchronize the entire
supply chain (1998). The numerous options eBay provides serves to smooth the link between
seller and buyer. Vokurka and Zank (2001) note that user friendly websites that add value to the
customer create a seamless link between internal and external processes and result in financial
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gain are critical factors for e-business initiatives. As evidenced by the millions of repeat users,
eBay provides an environment that links buyers to sellers and proves beneficial to all parties.
Chopra and Meindl (2001) list five typical supply chain stages: (1) components/raw
materials, (2) manufacturers, (3) wholesalers and distributors, (4) retailers, and (5) customers.
Keskinocak and Tayur (2001) identify three components of a supply chain: (1)
sourcing/procurement, (2) manufacturing and distribution, and (3) inventory disposal. Because
businesses set up primarily to provide service have little connection with a manufacturing
process, their supply chains encompass only some of the traditional supply chain stages. The
seller provides the item for sale, filling the initial supply chain stage. The items listed for sale
may be classified as the “inventory” in the process. eBay provides sellers the
wholesaler/distributor and retailer stages as its primary contribution to this selling process. The
customers, the final link in this supply chain, are the bidders.
Figure 1 shows the Chopra and Meindl (2000) depiction of supply chain stages. eBay
provides the distributor/retailer stage of this chain. Figure 2 gives a more detailed schematic
view of eBay's function as the distribution link in the customer-to-customer supply chain. The
seller lists items for sale. The eBay site provides the flow of information from seller to
bidder/buyer. In addition to the information flow, eBay provides sellers and buyers with options
that help smooth the business transaction. The value added to the process by eBay includes
access to information from both sides of the transaction and help in processing many of the steps
of the transaction. The search engines provided by eBay match the potential customer
(bidder/buyer) with the products available (from the seller).
Figure 1. Chopra and Meindl Depiction of Supply Chain with eBay’s placement
Supplier
----------

Manufacturer
Seller ---------

Distributor
--- The eBay Function ----

Retailer

Customer
Buyer

Chopra and Meindl (2001) list a number of supply chain transactions that e-businesses
perform. Many of these types of transactions are either provided by eBay directly or facilitated
by eBay. A key part of eBay’s service to sellers and buyers is providing information across the
supply chain. The auction format assists in the price negotiation phase of the business
transaction. The eBay Web site helps facilitate order placement, order tracking, and order
delivery processes by linking the buyer and seller with potential delivery agents. eBay also adds
value to the transaction by facilitating credit card payments.

Figure 2. The Supply Chain for a seller using eBay.
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The entrepreneur seller takes the risks and obtains and provides the inventory while the
bidder/buyer shops for bargains and attempts to minimize risk.
Seller listing options
Shipping options
Payment options

Seller

eBay Web Site

Bidder/Buyer

eBay functions
Processing information
Link with support
vendors
VALUE ADDED BY THE eBAY SERVICE
In the auction format the seller selects from a number of options for providing information.
The aim of this information is to attract bidders, ultimately increasing the winning auction price
and profit to the firm. The information conveyed by eBay in the form of seller options brings
value to this type of transaction. Some of these options include establishing the initial or
minimum bid price, shipping options, payment options, the product description, the heading or
title, the duration of the auction, and the quantity of units for sale (i.e., a regular auction vs. a
Dutch auction).
The seller must determine the initial bid price and can also set a reserve bid price (the
minimum amount accepted for the auction contract to be consummated). The seller may also
include a “buy it now” option that allows the initial bidder to purchase the item at a set price
before any lower bids are entered and the auction begins. The listing fee eBay charges is a
function of this initial bid. The inclusion of a reserve price reduces the probability that the
auction will end unsuccessfully (i.e., no sale is made). If the sale, however, is made it assures
that, at minimum, the seller’s reservation price is met. Some gamesmanship is involved in
determining the proper combination of minimum bid and reservation price that attracts sufficient
bidders but minimizes auction cost. Research on this issue was published in April 2000 by
Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2001) using 50 “matched pairs” of Pokemon trading cards. The
results of their research indicated that the use of secret reserve prices resulted in lower revenues
than when the reserve price was revealed to the buyers. The authors state that there are “negative
effects on probability of selling a card, the number of serious bidders, and the price received
from the winning bid” (Katkar and Lucking-Reiley, 2001).
The seller typically specifies the length of the auction, the shipping options, and shipping
prices (usually paid by the buyer). The seller can choose to have the auction last three, five,
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seven or ten days. The most frequently used delivery services are the U.S. Mail, Federal Express
or UPS. Payment options selected by the seller include certified check, money order, personal
check, or credit card. The advantages of using a credit card, generally processed by PayPal or
Billpoint, accrue to both the buyer and seller. Because sellers are generally reluctant to ship
merchandise prior to certifying that they have received good funds, the buyer using a credit card
may receive their purchase in the time it would take for a payment by certified, cashiers, or
personal check to be delivered to the seller. In the case of a personal check, the seller usually
specifies that shipping will be further delayed until the check has cleared the banking system.
While eBay provides all buyers a limited reimbursement up to $200 in the event of fraud, the
buyer using a credit card also has additional “insurance” provisions provided by the credit card
issuer. These provisions allow the buyer to contest the charges and in effect obtain a refund in
cases where the product never arrived or is damaged. The buyer sending a check or certified
funds has only eBay's fraud protection since one can not stop payment on a check after the check
has cleared the system and the seller has the funds. The seller accepting a credit card or using
PayPal, or one of their competitors, has the benefit of faster cash flow and hence a shorter cash
conversion cycle since the electronic transfers are available almost instantaneously.
The seller creates the description of the item for sale. For our calculator data set, sellers can
specify information regarding product characteristics that may enhance a sale such as the age and
shape of the product (“new”, “as is”, “damaged”– “major” or “minor wear”) and whether any
warranty accompanies the product. eBay allows two pictures to be posted at no charge. Because
buyers want to minimize the risk of the purchase, the seller's reputation is believed to be an
important variable. Near the end of the product display, eBay provides a feedback/ratings
section. This section lists the number of positive, neutral, and negative experiences reported by
auction participants who have had dealings with the seller. In addition, the buyer can review the
comments provided by the parties the seller has previously contracted with on eBay as either a
buyer, or a seller.
The following sections of this paper discuss the regression analyses used to evaluate the
importance of quantitative data available to customers who would consider using the ecommerce means for procurement/distribution operations. Auctions, like those facilitated by
eBay, provide information on many aspects of the process. The data set used to evaluate eBay
operations contains information on auctions of hand-held calculators. There are more than 25
variables identified and defined that measure eBay options and characteristics. Finding the
appropriate settings for the variables is important for businesses that use e-commerce to support
their distribution functions.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The intent of this study was to identify factors that influence supply chain efficiency and
effectiveness. Here, efficiency is defined as the ability of the distribution function (eBay) to
maximize the ending auction price. Effectiveness is defined as the ability of the chosen factor
levels to attract bidder customers. In other words, the study was looking for factors that
significantly impact the ending auction price and the number of bidders participating in the
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auction. Since many of those factors are under the control of the seller, identifying them may
help sellers improve the outcome of their sales.
Multiple regression analysis was used to determine which factors had significant influence on
each of the dependent variables, ending auction price, and number of bidders. Table 1 provides
the descriptive statistics from our data set. One regression model investigated the influence of the
variables on the ending auction price. The second model regressed the number of bidders against
the set of independent variables. Individual t-tests were used to identify significance of the
factors.
Between September 2000 and March 2001, we searched eBay daily for new auction listings
denominated in U.S. dollars for Hewlett Packard 12-C calculators. New listings were added to
one of several “Watch Lists.” As these auctions ended the relevant information was entered into
the data set. The specific data collected is listed and summarized below.
We excluded several auctions from our data set. If the last bid price was below the seller’s
“reserve price,” then no sale resulted and the auction was eliminated from the data set. Likewise,
when an auction received no bids, it was eliminated. When the auction included multiple items it
was eliminated. For example, if the auction included the HP12-C and another calculator, it was
excluded. We also eliminated any “Dutch Auctions.” Dutch Auctions occur when a seller lists
multiple calculators for sale to multiple bidders where the selling price for all of the calculators is
the lowest winning bid price. Auctions that ended with the recently implemented “Buy it Now”
feature were eliminated since the feature was not available the entire period and the auctions did
not have the full period of exposure. Our data set included 661 completed auctions meeting our
requirements. All references to monetary units are U.S. dollars.
When items are sold on eBay, the seller must select settings for a number of factors/options
to be included (or not) on the web page. For this study, we identified variables representing
options to the seller that could have some bearing on the selling process. In addition, variables
representing seller and buyer experiences were included in the data set. For each auction we
collected information on the following variables:
Price Numbids Bidders Hnewinbox Hmint Hnoreserve Firstbid Reservedu Month 3Days 5days -

the auction’s ending price - dependent variable for the first regression
The total number of bids the auction received
the number of distinct bidders - dependent variable for the second regression
a dummy variable =1 if the word “new” is in auction’s Heading; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the word “mint” is in the auction’s Heading; 0
otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the words “no reserve” are in Heading; 0 otherwise
amount of the first bid
a dummy = 1 if the seller exercised the option of using a reserve price; 0
otherwise
the month the auction ended
a dummy variable =1 for auctions lasting 3 days; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 for auctions lasting 5 days; 0 otherwise
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10days Weekend Hour Holidaydu Buyrate Picture Minorwear Majorwear Nocover Withmanual Nomanual
Nobatteries Newbatteries Newnbox Nonegbuy Ccard Salestax Pos Negative Moactive Freeshipping -

a dummy variable =1 for auctions lasting 10 days; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable = 1 for auctions that ended on Saturday or Sunday; 0
otherwise
the hour of the day that the auction ended
a dummy variable =1 if the auction ended on a holiday; 0 otherwise
the buyer’s eBay rating
a dummy variable =1 if the description included a picture of the item;0
otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description indicated “minor wear”; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description indicated “major wear” (such as the
battery cover missing, cracked display, etc); 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description included “no cover” (excluded the
vinyl case); 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description included “with manual”; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description included “no manual”; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description included “no batteries”; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description included “new batteries”; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description indicated that the calculator was new
and included the manual, cover, and paperwork; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the description indicated that bids from buyers with
negative comments would not be accepted; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the seller accepted credit cards; 0 otherwise
a dummy variable =1 if the buyer had to include sales tax; 0 otherwise
the number of positive comments received by the seller in the past
the number of negative comments received by the seller in the past
the number of months the seller has had that eBay account
A dummy variable = 1 if the seller paid the shipping; otherwise 0

Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1. As shown, the average final
price (the ending auction price of the calculator) for the calculators (Price) was nearly $41.27.
For comparison, a “Back to School” ad from Staples during the study period listed this calculator
for $69.99. Nearly 8% of these auctions were reserve auctions, where the seller stipulated that a
minimum bid was necessary to consummate the sale (reservedu). The fee for using the reserve
price option is $.50 if the reserve price is less than $25 and is $1 for reserve prices above $25.
The fee is refunded if the ending auction price is below the reserve price. Detailed information
on eBay's fees can be found on the eBay web site.
Several auctions used the terms “New,” “New In Box,” or “NIB,” “No Reserve” or “NR,”
and “Mint” in the heading of the auction. Variations of the term “New” in the heading were
found in nearly 29% of the auctions. “No Reserve” and its variations were used in nearly 9% of
the auctions, while “Mint” was listed 3% of the time.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
N
Mean
Hnewinbox
661
0.2874433
Hmint
661
0.0302572
Numbids
661
10.7110439
Bidders
661
6.1255673
Firstbid
661
13.5974130
Reservedu
661
0.0786687
Numdays
661
6.7715582
3-day
661
0.0922844
5-day
661
0.1770045
10-day
661
0.1649017
Weekend
661
0.3146747
Holidaydu
661
0.0272315
Picture
661
0.8124054
Minorwear
661
0.1558245
Majorwear
661
0.0166415
Nocover
661
0.0272315
Withmanual
661
0.3237519
Nomanual
661
0.1452345
Nobatteries
661
0.0468986
Newbatteries
661
0.0499244
Newnbox
661
0.3388805
Nonegbuy
661
0.0257186
Ccard
661
0.6747352
Salestax
661
0.1180030
Pos
661
623.0090772
Negative
661
8.1346445
Moactive
661
17.2329803
Freeshipping
661
0.0045386
Oct
661
0.1376702
Nov
661
0.1467474
Dec
661
0.1028744
Jan
661
0.1573374
Feb
661
0.1270802
Mar
661
0.1406959
Sat
661
0.1361573
Sun
661
0.1785174
M
661
0.1558245
T
661
0.1240545
W
661
0.1527988
Thr
661
0.1270802
F
661
0.1255673
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Std Dev
0.4529128
0.1714239
5.3735899
2.5597638
10.6871324
0.2694248
1.9031494
0.2896462
0.3819616
0.3713728
0.4647379
0.1628805
0.3906837
0.3629636
0.1280207
0.1628805
0.4682610
0.3526039
0.2115819
0.2179536
0.4736876
0.1584144
0.4688285
0.3228560
2174.75
50.5948107
10.9994574
0.0672668
0.3448144
0.3541218
0.3040249
0.3643943
0.3333150
0.3479709
0.3432153
0.3832377
0.3629636
0.3298933
0.3600659
0.3333150
0.3316120

Minimum
0
0
1.0000
1.0000
0.0100
0
3.0000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
1.0000
1.0000
52.0000
18.0000
61.0000
1.0000
10.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
27886.00
691.0000
56.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
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The typical auction received an average of 10.7 bids from an average of 6.13 distinct bidders.
The first bid averaged $13.60. While the seller cannot control the number of distinct bidders, or
the number of bids, they do set the initial price (first bid) of the auction. eBay charges the listing
fee for these auctions based on the minimum opening bid set by the seller. The listing fees range
from $.30 (for initial bids less than $10) to $2.20 (for initial bids greater than $50).
This data covered the months of September through March. The auctions were fairly evenly
split over the sample period ranging from 18.8% of the auctions ending in September and 10.2%
of the auctions ending in December. The closing day of the auction was investigated for
significance in determining the price of the calculators and the number of bidders they attracted.
Weekends (Saturday 13.6%, and Sunday 17.9%) accounted for nearly 31% of the auctions.
Monday and Wednesday each accounted for over 15% of the auctions while, Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday accounted for approximately 12.5% of the auctions each. We also tested to see if the
closing day being a holiday like Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day, or
Presidents Day influenced the winning price. Nearly 3% of the auctions ended on a holiday. We
collected the hour of the day the auction was completed as well. The default time was midnight
Pacific Time, 00 on the eBay clock. The average hour that the auction ended was 2:00 p.m.
Pacific time, the median time of an auction ending was 3:00 p.m. Pacific Time and the most
often auction ending time was 8:00 p.m. Pacific Time.
We read the descriptions of the calculators for each auction and searched for several key
words or phrases that we felt would enable the buyer to evaluate the calculator. The first set of
these we classified as either “minor wear” or “major wear.” The dummy for minor wear was
given when the seller indicated in the description that the calculator had small scratches or the
HP brand mark was worn, etc. The dummy for “major wear” was used if the calculator was not
working, the battery cover was missing or broken, the display was damaged, etc. Calculators
with minor wear indicated accounted for nearly 15.6% of the auctions, while major wear added
another 1.7%.
Since calculators come from the factory with a soft plastic cover and an instruction manual,
we searched the description for auctions that indicated that the calculator came with the manual
(withmanual), without the manual (nomanual), or without the cover (nocover). Thirty-two
percent of auctions included the manual with the calculator, 14.5% stated that they did not
include the manual, (the remaining 53% did not mention the manual), and 2.7% of the auctions
indicated that there was no cover included with the calculator being auctioned. Furthermore, the
seller included a picture of the calculator in 81% of the auctions in this data set.
Approximately equal sets of sellers auctioned the calculators with no batteries (or dead
batteries) or with a set of new batteries. Those with no batteries accounted for 4.7% of the
auctions, while those with new batteries made up 5% of the sample. Nearly one third of the
calculators were described as “new in the box.” These calculator auctions should include the
manual, cover, new batteries, and warranty information.
eBay auctions allow for payments to be made by credit card using the services of either
Paypal or Billpoint. These firms collect a percentage of the price from the seller and
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electronically transfer funds from the buyer’s savings, checking, or credit card accounts to the
seller. If the seller does not accept credit cards, then the buyer must either send a check or a
money order for payment. Most sellers state that they will delay shipping of the product for 7 to
10 days if a check is sent to allow it to clear. Further, if payment is made through Paypal or
Billpoint, most sellers will ship the day after the electronic transfer is made. Sellers accepting
credit cards made up 67.5% of the auctions in this sample.
Reputation influences may run in both directions. Roughly 3% of the sellers indicated that
they would not transact with buyers with negative comments in their history. The buyer has the
opportunity to view comments by participants to the seller’s previous transactions. Further, the
length of time the seller has been registered with eBay may also serve as a measure of reputation.
We noted the number of positive and negative comments each seller had, and the number of
months they had been active. The average number of positive comments in this sample was 623,
with a standard deviation of 2174.8, a minimum of 0, a maximum of 27886, and a median of 78.
The average number of negative comments in this sample was 8.1, with a standard deviation of
50.59, a minimum of 0, a maximum of 691 and a median of 0. The typical seller in this sample
has had an account for 17.23 months with a standard deviation of 11 months, a minimum of 0
months, maximum of 56 months and a median of 17 months.
HYPOTHYSES AND RESULTS
The use of the terms “new,” “mint,” or “no reserve” in the heading and/or the inclusion of a
picture were expected to attract the buyer’s attention and were hypothesized to positively impact
the ending price and the number of bidders. In each case we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
these variables have an impact except for the term “New in Box” in the heading. This variable is
significant (t=1.69, p<10%) at only the 10% level in attracting bidders.
The number of bidders was hypothesized to positively impact the price of the auction. For
every additional person that bid in an auction, the final price of the calculator increased by nearly
$1. The increase in price was more than just a tautology, though. For an additional buyer to be
listed, they must have increased the bid. However, for auctions in this price range, the minimum
bid increase was only $0.50.
The seller sets the initial bid when setting up the auction. We hypothesized that the lower the
initial bid the more (bargain hunting) bidders would be attracted, but that this should not impact
the market clearing price of the auction. Specifically, we hypothesized that there would be no
impact of the initial bid on the ending price of the auction, but that there would be a negative
relation between initial bid price and the number bidders. Results indicated that there is a
statistically significant positive relation between the first bid and the final selling price. Results
showed statistically that the first bid was negatively related to the number of bidders, as
expected. For every $1 that the initial price was raised, the number of bidders decreased by .12
(t=-14.5 p<.01%). The coefficient on “firstbid” was .259. This indicated that for every $1
increase in the first bid, the final price increased by approximately $0.26. This result may have
been caused by our exclusion of auctions that did not end in a completed transaction. This result
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is actually the increase in the final price given that a sale resulted. Auctions with first bid prices
too high would conceivably get no bidders and were excluded from this data set.
The seller may have included a reserve price. We hypothesized that a reserve price would
increase the final price of the auction. Results indicated that the presence of the reserve price
option did increase the final price of the auction by $2.90. Again, this result may have been
affected by the exclusion of auctions where the highest bid was below the reserve price.
We controlled for the month the auction ended in our two regressions. The use of dummy
variables in regression required that one of the months be excluded from the regression. That
month was September. Except for the month of December (which was not significant), all of the
auction prices in the other months were statistically different from the prices in September. The
prices were significantly higher (at the 10% level or lower) for the months of October ($1.80),
January ($2.27), February ($5.43), and March ($2.71). However, the closing prices were
significantly lower in the month of November (-$3.17). The number of bidders was statistically
higher in three of the other months by about one additional bidder than in September (January
(1.12), February (1.64), and March (1.32)).
Several previous studies have looked at the weekend effect with mixed results. These studies
usually hypothesized that there were more buyers and higher closing prices since it is believed
that Internet shopping is a leisure activity and more leisure time is available on weekends.
Melnik and Alm (2001) found a statistically significant positive coefficient for auctions ending
on either Saturday or Sunday. However, Standifird (2001) found a statistically significant
negative coefficient for weekend ending auctions. Our study found that the hypothesis claiming
higher prices and more bidders on weekends is false. Results demonstrate that the final price on
auctions ending on a weekend (Saturday and Sunday) is $2.14 lower than those ending Monday
through Friday, a strong result with a t=-3.51. Furthermore, results indicated that auctions ending
on a weekend had a statistically significant .45 (t= -2.46) fewer bidders.
We also studied auctions ending on a holiday. As with weekends, more leisure time is
believed to be available, allowing for more bidders and higher ending prices. Results indicated
that there was no statistical impact of a holiday on either the ending price or the number of
bidders.
Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves, (2000) observed that longer auctions result in
higher final bid prices. In this study the default auction period was 7 days. We hypothesized that
10-day auctions would have more bidders and higher prices while 3- and 5-day auctions would
have fewer bidders and lower prices. Regarding price, the 3- and 10-day auction results were not
statistically different from the 7-day auction, while the 5-day auctions showed a $1.44 higher
price (t=1.87, p<7%). Three-day auctions received bids from .51 fewer bidders (t=-1.66,
p<10%), though 10-day auctions received bids from an additional .48 bidders (t=2, p<5%). Fiveday auctions were not significantly from 7-day auctions in attracting bidders.
Indications of wear (either minor or major) should decrease the price of the auction. We
hypothesized further that these wear indications would decrease the number of bidders, also. The
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regression results showed that any indication of wear economically and significantly reduced the
closing price of the auction. Minor wear reduced the price by $3.18 while calculators with major
wear sold for an average $10.63 less than calculators that did not have wear. Results showed that
calculators with minor wear do not statistically significantly reduce the number of bidders, while
auctions for calculators with major damage were bid on by an average of 1.55 (p<.03) fewer
bidders.
We hypothesized that the inclusion of a manual would increase the price and the number of
bidders. If the auction indicated that no manual was included (nomanual), the regression results
indicated that the price was no different than the 53% of the auctions that did not mention the
manual, although they were bid on by an average of .48 (t=-1.61, p<11%) fewer bidders.
However, if the description stated that the manual was included, the ending auction price was
$5.31 higher than the auctions that did not mention the manual, and they received bids from an
additional .66 bidders. The lack of a cover did not significantly reduce the price or the number of
bidders.
We believe that bidders assume that the auction is for a working calculator, which would
include working batteries. We hypothesized that auctions of calculators that lack batteries would
have both a lower ending price and fewer bidders. The regression results indicated that listing a
calculator without batteries significantly reduced the final price of the sale by $3.04, and
indicated that 1.12 fewer buyers bid in such an auction. Selling the calculator with new batteries
did not significantly change the price or the number of bidders in the auction. In fact, the value of
the coefficient for “newbatteries” was negative .34 (t = -.25, p<80%). Since this calculator
requires three batteries and each battery costs between $1.49 and $1.79, it seems economically
advantageous to sell the calculator without batteries and save the trip to Wal-Mart.
If the seller indicated that the calculator was “new” or “new in box” in the description, we
hypothesized that it would attract more buyers and result in a higher price. Results indicated that
the coefficient for the variable “newnbox” is a statistically and economically significant $9.34
(t=7.79)! However, the use of these terms did not increase the number of bidders on the auction.
Shipping expenses are usually borne by the buyer. Only a few sellers indicated that they
would pay shipping. We hypothesized that sellers implementing this marketing tool would reap a
higher final bid price and an increase in the number of bidders. The regression results in the
tables did not reject the null hypotheses that the coefficient is zero, however.
We believe that accepting credit card payments increases the speed of delivery, since the
seller does not have to wait for payment to be delivered and checks to clear, and that this
increase in speed is valuable to the bidder. Therefore, we hypothesized that sellers who accept
credit cards would receive higher ending prices and more bidders at their auctions. The
regression results on price indicated that the auctions accepting credit cards ended an average
$1.45 higher than auctions that did not. Credit card acceptance did not significantly increase the
number of buyers, though.
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We tested a number of reputation variables, including the number of months the seller has
had an account and the number of positive and negative comments they had acquired. Under the
belief that only a “real business” would collect sales tax and that being a “real business” would
enhance the reputation of the seller and/or reduce the perceived risk of the buyer, we controlled
for sellers who collected sales tax, if the calculator was shipped within the same state as the
seller. None of these variables were significant in these regressions, however.
The buyer’s reputation was important to nearly 3% of the sellers. They indicated in the
auction listing that they would not sell to bidders with negative feedback listed. We hypothesized
that including this restriction would reduce the number of potential bidders and the ending price
of the auction. However, the variable “nonegbuy” was not significant in either regression.
CONCLUSIONS
This research investigated the auction properties that influence eBay's effectiveness (ability
to attract bidders) and efficiency (ability to maximize price or profit) as the distribution link of
the supply chain. It extends the literature pioneered by Lucking-Reiley (2000) on eBay auctions.
Our research examined an inexpensive functional item, the HP12-C financial calculator, rather
than functional, but expensive items such as the Palm Pilots used in Standifird’s (2001) data set
or the collectable Pokemon cards in Katkar and Lucking-Reiley’s (2001) paper.
We found that the effectiveness of using eBay was influenced by the item description in the
auction heading, the initial price, the timing of the auction, and the operating condition of the
item. The efficiency of eBay was influenced by the ability to attract bidders, the pricing factors
set up by the seller, the product’s description, its operating condition, the timing of the auction,
and the method of payment options available to the buyer.
Like many other links of the supply chain, the timing of the auction or sale was important. In
this study, the sellers saw significantly higher prices and more bidders when the auction ended
on weekdays than when the auctions ended on a weekend. The month the auction ended also had
significant impacts on price and the number of bidders. This study found that 3-day auctions
attracted fewer buyers while 10-day auctions attracted more buyers than 7-day auctions.
However, this study also found that the price of 5-day auctions was significantly different from
7-day auctions.
Information on quality characteristics and operating condition was observed on the sale pages
describing the calculators for sale. Positive statements on quality (new-in-box, and with manual)
significantly increased price and the number of bidders, while negative statements on quality or
operating condition (minor wear, major wear, or no batteries) significantly decreased price and
bidders. In this study, some of the quality characteristics (no cover, no manual, new batteries)
had no significant impact on price or the number of bidders.
The seller's ability to earn higher ending bids was found to be a function of the number of
distinct bidders, the first bid, the use of the reserve option, and accepting credit cards. While the
seller cannot directly control the number of distinct bidders to their auction, they do set the initial
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or first bid and the reserve price. Furthermore, the seller has the option of allowing the buyer to
use credit card payments either directly or through Paypal or Billpoint. The convenience of using
a credit card not only brought benefit to the seller in increasing the speed of collection, it brought
in a significantly higher price.
Finally, it was interesting to note from Table 1 that the range of winning bids showed that
Internet auctions might bring higher prices than retail. The use of eBay (or another online auction
method) to supplement or provide major pieces of the distribution function of the supply chain
can be both effective and efficient.
Although specific results of this study are not generalizable, per se, the structure of the
research should be of interest to practitioners. It would be appropriate for any business using
Internet auctions to conduct a similar study to identify significant factors to include on the
auction page, the best timing for the auctions, and other factors that could improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of the distribution function.
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